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Let’s Talk About Text: Contracts, Claims,
and Judicial Philosophy at the Federal Circuit
This Article began as a research project with the goal of examining the congruence of 
Federal Circuit claim construction doctrine and American contract interpretation doctrine. 
But during a review of the Federal Circuit’s own contract law cases, a broader picture 
emerged—one of a court struggling to interpret legal documents, particularly contracts and 
patents. This Article describes how the Federal Circuit’s contract interpretation doctrine 
parallels claim construction doctrine and ends by discussing implications for scholars and 
attorneys in the field of patent law. 
I. A TAle of Two MeThodologies
R. Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge describe the ideological divide at the Federal 
Circuit as a split between “procedural” and “holistic” methodologies.2 The procedural 
approach favors a rigid evidentiary hierarchy. For the procedural jurist, the plain and 
ordinary meaning of words will typically be dispositive of interpretive issues. Extrinsic 
evidence, other than dictionaries, is generally disregarded by courts applying the procedural 
methodology.3 The holistic methodology, by contrast, is less rigid than the procedural 
methodology, and it is more willing to ignore an evidentiary hierarchy in favor of relying on 
the most compelling evidence presented in a particular case.4 A court utilizing the holistic 
methodology might begin an analysis by discussing the prosecution history or expert 
testimony, while courts relying on the procedural approach will always dutifully begin with 
plain language.
A similar divergence is reflected more generally, and more famously, in the field of 
statutory interpretation. Hypertextualists tend to focus on words in isolation, and they often 
1.  J.D. Candidate, Class of 2013, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. All alterations to quotations are 
my own unless otherwise indicated. Special thanks is due to Professors Greg Castanias, Mark D. Janis, and 
Mike Mattioli for their welcome feedback on this Article. All views expressed and mistakes made are my own.
2.  R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of 
Judicial Performance, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1105, 1111 n.19 (2004).
3.  Id.
4.  Id.
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5.  Id. at 1131.
6.  See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that 
statutes should be construed in the context of the surrounding language and ordinary usage). The Texas Digital 
line of cases can be described as hypertextualism tempered by checking the dictionary definition against the 
intrinsic record. Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Phillips, which 
diplomatically rejected the Texas Digital approach, can be described as weak pragmatic textualism because the 
opinion is still hostile to extrinsic evidence. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en 
banc).
7.  See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993) (relying on dictionary definitions to hold that 
exchanging a gun for drugs was “using” a gun “during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime”) 
(alterations in original); id. at 241–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying on common usage, surrounding statutory 
language, and other legal texts to read the statute as requiring that a gun be used as a weapon, to the exclusion 
of other “uses”). 
8.  Samuel Williston is often associated with the harsh four corners approach. See Mark L. Movsesian, 
Rediscovering Williston, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 207 (2005). However, because Williston’s treatise does not 
adopt the extreme view I am describing here, I will not associate Williston with it. See 11 RichaRd a. LoRd, 
WiLListon on contRacts § 33:38 (4th ed. 2011) (noting that extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances is 
always relevant).
9.  See LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Serv. Merch. Co., 827 F.2d 74, 78 (7th Cir. 1987) (“If the language of the contract 
unambiguously provides an answer to the question at hand, the inquiry is over.”).
10.  See, e.g., Independence Twp. v. Reliance Bldg. Co., 437 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (“[W]here a 
contract is not ambiguous, evidence of custom and practice in an industry is not admissible.”).
11.  Restatement (second) of contRacts § 220 cmt. d (1981) (“There is no requirement that an ambiguity be 
shown before usage can be shown . . . . The normal effect of a usage on a written contract is to vary its meaning 
from the meaning it would otherwise have.”).
12.  Id. § 202 (“Words and other conduct are interpreted in light of all the circumstances.”). 
defer to dictionary definitions.5 Pragmatic textualists are more inclined to rely on context and 
extrinsic evidence of usage.6 For example, the phrase “uses a gun,” read in context, would 
normally be read to mean “uses a gun as a weapon,” not as “uses a gun for any purpose.”7 
ii. ConTeMporAry ConTrACT inTerpreTATion
Two divergent schools of contract interpretation exist today: what can be labeled the “four 
corners school” and the “Corbin school.”8 The four corners school relies on the text of the 
document itself—if there is no facial ambiguity based on the plain language of the contract, 
then no resort to extrinsic evidence can be had.9 Evidence of trade usage and custom is 
excluded from consideration under this approach.10
The Corbin school rejects the proposition that words have “plain” or “objective” meanings 
that can be discerned simply by reading a document. Instead, Corbin’s analysis looks to 
the surrounding factual context to understand what the parties intended the words to mean. 
Corbin’s philosophy is embodied in the Restatement, which, in contrast to the four corners 
school, allows evidence of trade usage and custom to be introduced to show that a facially 
unambiguous contract does, in fact, mean something else entirely.11 Further, the Restatement 
always allows courts to consider extrinsic evidence, without regard to facial ambiguity.12 The 
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13.  Corbin’s approach is not without its own weaknesses. Extensive reliance on extrinsic evidence can 
increase the duration, complexity, and expense of litigation. It injects more uncertainty into the interpretive 
process, and thus makes it more difficult for negotiating parties to evaluate their relative bargaining positions. 
Corbin’s philosophy also creates incentives for litigants to engage in an ex post facto attempt to rewrite the 
contract in light of their litigation goals, even by perjury.
14.  See, e.g., id. § 220; U.C.C. § 2-202 (2004); 3 aRthUR L. coRbin, coRbin on contRacts § 555 (1960); 12 
LoRd, supra note 8, § 34:5.
15.  McAbee Constr., Inc. v. United States, 97 F.3d 1431, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“To resolve the debate, then, 
we must first determine whether the release language in [the agreement] is unambiguous. Only in the event of 
an ambiguity may we examine extrinsic or parol evidence.”). When interpreting licensing agreements, the Federal 
Circuit follows regional law. This Part will focus on government contracts, which represent the CAFC’s own 
unique jurisprudence. The CAFC’s approach to applying state contract law would be an interesting topic for further 
research, because it might demonstrate that the CAFC applies state law standards differently than the state courts.
rationale for this approach is that a document that seems clear on its face may have meant 
something very different to the parties. Without the benefit of extrinsic evidence to provide 
context, a court has no way to know if it has arbitrarily interpreted the contract in a fashion 
that the parties never contemplated.13
The same divergence Wagner and Petherbridge have identified on the Federal Circuit 
is also present in contract law generally: the four corners approach is procedural, while 
Corbin’s philosophy is holistic.
This Article’s discussion of contract law will focus on the role of trade usage and custom in 
contract interpretation. This focus has been adopted for two reasons. First, the most authoritative 
sources recognize that evidence of trade usage and custom is always relevant.14 Thus, any break 
from the dominant approach is instructive as to the overall jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit—
that is, it illustrates that something has driven the Federal Circuit away from prevailing doctrinal 
views. Second, trade usage has a unique relationship to claim construction, because trade usage 
is analogous to patent law’s cardinal claim construction rule: claims must be given the meaning 
they would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Similarly, trade usage is concerned with 
what a given term means from the perspective of merchants in a particular commercial field.
III. ConTrACT inTerpreTATion AT The federAl CirCuiT
Consistent with its emphasis on intrinsic evidence when interpreting patent claims, the 
Federal Circuit leans toward the “four corners” approach to contract interpretation.15 To 
see how the Federal Circuit arrived at this stance, it is useful to look to the development 
of the doctrine and to see how the court has struggled with the role of extrinsic evidence. 
Excluding extrinsic evidence in contract law creates more problems for the procedural jurist 
than it does in patent law, because in patent law, judges can rely on the specification and 
prosecution history as a sort of quasi-extrinsic, textual evidence. In other words, patent law 
treats the specification and prosecution history as incorporated by reference into the claims, 
even though it is only the claims that are being interpreted.
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16.  351 F.2d 987 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
17.  See Merando, Inc. v. United States, 475 F.2d 603 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Nw. Indus. Piping, Inc. v. United States, 
467 F.2d 1308 (Ct. Cl. 1972); S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. United States, 433 F.2d 1314 (Ct. Cl. 1970). 
18.  Appeal of Marion Constr. Co., 1977 WL 2622 (P.S.B.C.A. 1977).
19.  McAbee Constr., Inc., 97 F.3d at 1434.
20.  Id. at 1433.
21.  Id.
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. at 1433 (alterations in original).
25.  Id.
26.  Id. at 1434. “An integrated agreement is a writing or writings constituting a final expression of one or more 
terms of an agreement.” Restatement (second) of contRacts § 209 (1981).
27.  McAbee Constr., Inc., 97 F.3d at 1434. 
28.  Id. 
In 1965, the then-United States Court of Claims held in Gholson, Byars, and Holmes 
Construction Co. v. United States that trade usage could be admitted as extrinsic evidence, 
even where a document is unambiguous on its face.16 Shortly after the Gholson decision, the 
Court of Claims issued several opinions holding that trade usage could not be introduced 
where the document is clear on its face; these later holdings did not cite Gholson.17 The 
conflict created by these latter cases led the Postal Service Board of Contract Appeals to 
hold that “[Gholson] cannot be read broadly and must be limited strictly to the facts of that 
case.”18
A line of cases illustrates the same split occurring at the Federal Circuit. The 1996 
McAbee Construction, Inc. v. United States19 decision is illustrative of a strict procedural 
methodology. McAbee, a landowner, granted the Army Corps of Engineers an easement to 
use its land as a disposal site for construction materials.20 Before the construction materials 
were dumped on McAbee’s land, the ground elevation ranged from 135 to 160 feet.21 The 
Corps returned the land at an elevation of 183 feet.22 McAbee alleged that the Corps had 
breached the contract by violating an understanding that the land would be returned at an 
elevation no greater than 165 feet.23 The relevant contract provision authorized the Corps to 
“deposit fill, spoil and waste material [on McAbee’s land] . . . and to perform any other work 
necessary and incident to the construction of the project.”24 The contract also contained an 
integration clause.25
The court began by recognizing that binding Court of Claims precedents required the 
admission of parol evidence to show whether a contract is integrated.26 But the court 
immediately demonstrated its hostility to that proposition when it stated that “[t]he parties 
here explicitly stated that the contract was fully integrated” and that consequently “McAbee 
carrie[d] an extremely heavy burden in overcoming this attestation to the document’s finality 
and completeness.”27 The court found that McAbee had “pointed to no extrinsic evidence 
that supports its assertion that the contract was not fully integrated.”28 In an analysis that 
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29.  Id. at 1435 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
30.  Id. (citations omitted).
31.  Id.
32.  W. Stanfield Johnson, Interpreting Government Contracts: Plain Meaning Precludes Extrinsic Evidence 
and Controls at the Federal Circuit, 34 PUb. cont. L.J. 635, 647 (2005).
33.  McAbee Constr., Inc., 97 F.3d at 1434.
34.  919 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
35.  Id. at 1569.
seems tautological, the court discounted extrinsic evidence showing that McAbee had 
pressed the Corps on the subject of ground elevation because no ground elevation limitation 
was ultimately included in the contract. 
The McAbee court next asked whether the contract was ambiguous, such that extrinsic 
evidence of an agreement on ground elevation could be shown. The court recited the 
familiar standard that if the “provisions are clear and unambiguous, they must be given 
their plain and ordinary meaning, and the court may not resort to extrinsic evidence to 
interpret them.”29 “To permit otherwise would cast ‘a long shadow of uncertainty over all 
transactions’ and contracts.”30
In a highly formalistic analysis, the court found the document unambiguous. “The 
language of the easement expressly permitted the Corps to deposit fill and waste on 
McAbee’s land, and to perform any other work on the tract as long as it was ‘necessary 
and incident’ to the project. Consequently, the trial court’s conclusion that the absence of 
a height restriction created an ambiguity is incorrect.”31 Under this strange interpretation, 
the Corps could have been within its rights to return the land to McAbee with the deposited 
waste stacked a mile high.
To understand how rigid this interpretation was, it is useful to consider the opinion of 
the court below, which had found for McAbee. The trial court relied on the following 
extrinsic evidence: (1) a map provided to McAbee by the Corps showing an elevation 
of 165 feet, which was presented to the plaintiffs in response to their concerns about 
excessive dumping; (2) evidence that the government had otherwise assured McAbee 
about the 165 foot height limitation; and (3) testimony from the government’s own 
real estate appraiser stating that the government’s valuations were premised on a land 
elevation of about 165 feet.32 Yet the court concluded that “no extrinsic evidence . . . 
supports [McAbee’s] assertion that the contract was not fully integrated,” nor did this 
evidence show an ambiguity.33
An earlier example of procedural methodology at the Federal Circuit is R.B. Wright 
Construction Co. v. United States.34 The case involved three contracts between a 
construction company and the Department of the Army to perform miscellaneous repairs 
on several World War II era barracks. The contracts called for three coats of paint, 
including a primer coat, to be applied to all of the barracks’ walls.35 The problem was 
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36.  Id. at 1574 (Plager, J., dissenting).
37.  Id. at 1571.
38.  Id. at 1572.
39.  Id. at 1573–74.
40.  169 F.3d 747 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
41.  Id. at 749.
42.  Id.
43.  Id. 
44.  Id. at 749–50.
45.  Id. at 753–54.
46.  Id. at 751.
that many of the walls already had several coats of paint on them. Because primer is 
intended to be applied to bare surfaces, not paint, a coat of primer would have actually 
made the finished paint job inferior in quality.36 When the contractor did not apply primer 
to certain walls that had already been painted , the government ordered R.B. Wright 
to do so. R.B. Wright complied but sued to recover the cost of complying with the 
government’s request. 
The court held that the plain meaning of the contract required three coats of paint, 
including primer.37 The panel majority rejected R.B. Wright’s trade practice evidence, 
holding that “[n]either a contractor’s belief nor customary practice . . . can make an 
unambiguous contract provision ambiguous.”38 Judge Plager dissented, arguing that 
the case was “not so much a problem of legal interpretation as it [was] of common 
sense.”39
A panel consisting of Judges Plager, Rader, and Rich confronted the split created 
by Gholson, McAbee, and R.B. Wright in Metric Constructors, Inc. v. NASA.40 There, 
a construction contract required “new lamps” to be “installed immediately prior to the 
completion of the project.”41 Metric contended that this provision applied only to “defective, 
burned out, or broken lamps.”42 NASA, on the other hand, argued that the contract required 
the replacement of all lamps, known as “relamping” in the industry.43 Under McAbee and 
R.B. Wright, it would seem obvious that NASA had the better side of the argument—the 
plain language inescapably requires that all lamps be replaced. And yet the panel reversed 
the decision below, which had relied on plain language.
The court engaged in a lengthy analysis of the conduct of the government under similar 
contracts, as well as the parties’ conduct and other surrounding circumstances.44 Because the 
panel’s review of the evidence demonstrated that the contract contained a latent ambiguity, 
the court construed the contract against the drafter and limited “new lamps” to “defective, 
burned out, or broken lamps.”45 In its recitation of the governing legal standards, the court 
began uncharacteristically by stating that “[w]hen a contract is susceptible to more than one 
reasonable interpretation, it contains an ambiguity.”46 This is a clear contrast to cases that 
begin by reciting the plain language standard. 
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47.  Id. at 752.
48.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).
49.  Id. 
50.  Id. at 753 (“The Gholson rule and these principles of contract interpretation find general support in 
authoritative legal commentaries. The commentaries agree that courts should use evidence of trade practice 
and custom not only to determine the meaning of an ambiguous provision, but to determine whether a contract 
provision is ambiguous in the first instance.”).
51.  Id. at 752. This is the gloss that Metric Constructors uses to distinguish R.B. Wright. Id.
52.  Id.
53.  234 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
54.  Id. at 1366.
55.  Id. at 1367.
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. at 1367, 1370.
The court’s discussion of the role of trade usage is very Corbin-esque. 
Excluding evidence of trade practice and custom because the contract terms 
are “unambiguous” on their face ignores the reality of the context in which the 
parties contracted. That context may well reveal that the terms of the contract are 
not, and never were, clear on their face. On the other hand, that context may well 
reveal that contract terms are, and have consistently been, unambiguous.47
“Thus, to interpret contract terms, the context and intention [of the contracting parties] 
are more meaningful than the dictionary definition.”48 The panel went so far as to say 
that “evidence of trade practice and custom is part of the initial assessment of contract 
meaning.”49 In support of these propositions, the court discussed Gholson and cited 
Williston, Corbin, and the Restatement.50
The panel immediately qualified these broad statements in an effort to fit them together 
with the plain language cases. Trade practice and usage could not be used “to create an 
ambiguity where a contract was not reasonably susceptible of differing interpretations at the 
time of contracting,”51 and evidence of trade practice and usage should be admitted “only 
where a party makes a showing that it relied reasonably” on the meaning of the words at the 
time of contracting.52 In spite of these efforts at harmonization, Metric Constructors cannot 
be squared with R.B. Wright and McAbee.
Metric Constructors was followed roughly two years later by Jowett, Inc. v. United 
States, another influential decision.53 There, a contract stated that “duct installation” was 
not required on “ceilings which form plenums.”54 The dispute was over whether Jowett, 
a construction firm hired by the Army Corps of Engineers, had to install insulation on 
the ducts within the ceilings.55 Jowett introduced affidavits from four construction firm 
executives stating that there was a well-established trade practice of not insulating such 
ducts.56 The trial court declined to give any weight to the evidence of a trade practice 
because it conflicted with the plain language of the contract, and the panel agreed.57
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58.  Id. at 1368. The complete quotation used was as follows: “In interpreting a contract, a court may accept 
evidence of trade practice and custom. However, ‘a court should accept evidence of trade practice only where a 
party makes a showing that it relied reasonably on a competing interpretation of the words when it entered into 
the contract.’” Id. (quoting Metric Constructors, Inc. v. NASA, 169 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. at 1369 (“[Metric Constructors] based [its holding] on the absence of the term ‘relamping’ from the 
contract.”).
61.  Id. at 1369–70.
62.  Id. at 1369.
63.  Metric Constructors, Inc. v. NASA, 169 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
64.  281 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
65.  Id. at 1373.
66.  See supra note 13.
67.  323 F.3d 1035 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc).
The Jowett court began by citing McAbee for the plain language approach, followed by 
a citation to Metric Constructors that omitted all of its expansive language.58 The panel 
was clearly disturbed by Jowett’s (correct) view that Metric Constructors “enables industry 
practice to create an ambiguity, even before the language of the contract is itself analyzed 
to determine if an ambiguity lies within the four corners of the contract.”59 Jowett read 
Metric Constructors as exclusively relying on the fact that the trade term “relamping” was 
omitted from the contract.60 Hence, evidence of trade practice was “irrelevant” unless there 
was “a specific term that has a well-understood meaning in the industry and that was used 
in, or omitted from, the contract.”61 Evidence of “a supposed common industry practice” is 
“simply irrelevant where the language of the contract is unambiguous on its face.”62
It is hard to read Jowett as anything but an attempt to limit the applicability of Metric 
Constructors to its facts. Indeed, Jowett has the unfortunate effect of turning Metric Constructors 
into a hypertextual holding, when the entire rationale behind the decision was to avoid blind 
adherence to plain language. Rather than following the rule that “evidence of trade practice 
and custom is part of the initial assessment of contract meaning,”63 the panel outright refused to 
consider trade practice because it deemed the language of the contract to be unambiguous. 
Jowett’s gloss on Metric Constructors was reaffirmed in Hunt Construction Group v. 
United States.64 There, the court held that trade practice “may be useful,” but because there 
was no “term of art included or omitted” in the contract, “the contract’s unambiguous 
terms govern[ed].”65 Thus, within a span of two years, Metric Constructors went from 
being a decision requiring the consideration of trade practice evidence to a decision that 
merely describes a helpful approach for when a specific term of art is at issue. This view 
of trade practice and usage is inconsistent with leading secondary sources that do not limit 
consideration of trade practice and usage to particular terms of art.66
Another blow was dealt to the holistic methodology by Coast Federal Bank, FSB v. United 
States, an en banc Winstar case.67 The opinion unanimously rejects the consideration of any 
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68.  Id. at 1040.
69.  Id. 
70.  465 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
71.  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1311–24 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (analyzing numerous rules and 
canons of claim construction).
72.  Teg-Paradigm, 465 F.3d at 1338.
73.  But see Tri-Star Elecs. Int’l, Inc. v. Preci-Dip Durtal SA, 619 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In the 
case of contracts, the avowed purpose and primary function of the court is the ascertainment of the intention of 
the parties.”) (quoting Alvin Ltd. v. United States Postal Serv., 816 F.2d 1562, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
74.  Teg-Paradigm, 465 F.3d at 1338.
75.  Id. 
76.  Id.
77.  Id.
78.  Metric Constructors, Inc. v. NASA, 169 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
79.  Teg-Paradigm, 465 F.3d at 1338.
extrinsic evidence when the agreement’s language is unambiguous.68 The court did, however, 
discuss extrinsic evidence and found it consistent with the plain language.69 That could explain 
why the opinion was unanimous, in spite of the repeated recitation of the plain language rule.
Teg-Paradigm Environmental, Inc. v. United States,70 a 2006 panel opinion, illustrates the 
difficulties the court has created by failing to overrule any of its prior holdings regarding extrinsic 
evidence. The opinion contains a Phillips v. AWH Corp.-like71 recitation of the approaches to 
contract interpretation already discussed, but the opinion does not acknowledge the conflicts 
between these precedents. The court begins by citing Metric Constructors for the proposition 
that “the language of [the] contract must be given [the] meaning that would be derived 
from the contract by a reasonably intelligent person acquainted with the contemporaneous 
circumstances.”72 The panel’s discussion of Federal Circuit contract interpretation doctrine thus 
begins by contravening the axiomatic rule that contracts should be construed as intended by the 
parties, not according to the perspective of a tort-style reasonably prudent person.73
Next, the court cites McAbee and Coast Federal for the proposition that unambiguous 
language controls, to the exclusion of all extrinsic evidence.74 Yet the next sentence cites Coast 
Federal for the proposition that the court may look to extrinsic evidence to confirm the plain 
meaning, without explaining how a court can consider extrinsic evidence while simultaneously 
ignoring it.75 The court goes on to recite the test for ambiguity—whether the contract is 
“susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation”—which then justifies using extrinsic 
evidence to effectuate “the parties’ intent at the time they executed the contract.”76 
The opinion continues, “[e]ven when a contract is unambiguous, it may be appropriate to 
turn to one common form of extrinsic evidence—evidence of trade practice and custom.”77 
This statement cannot be reconciled with the rule in Metric Constructors that evidence of trade 
practice and usage is to be considered at the outset of every case.78 The court cites both Jowett 
and Metric Constructors in this portion, without acknowledging their conflicting language.79
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80.  Id. 1338–39.
81.  Id. at 1339.
82.  Id. 
83.  Id. at 1333.
84.  Id. at 1339.
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. 
87.  Id. at 1340.
88.  Id. at 1340–41.
89.  See Daewoo Eng’g & Const. Co. v. United States, 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (affirming Court of 
Federal Claims’ interpretation of an ambiguous contract on a clear error standard) (citing Beta Sys., Inc. v. 
United States, 838 F.2d 1179, 1183 (Fed. Cir 1988)). Note that the panel had to rely on a 1988 precedent 
as authority for its holding that a question of fact existed, and Beta Systems itself cited no precedent for its 
holding that ambiguity creates a question of fact. Rather, Beta Systems simply cited Williston and Corbin’s 
treatises. Beta Systems, Inc., 838 F.2d at 1183; see also Bell BCI Co. v. United States, 570 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (relying on McAbee to reverse the lower court’s contract interpretation, which had involved findings of 
fact, because the majority found the contract unambiguous; Judge Newman dissented); Thomas Creek Lumber 
& Log Co. v. Kempthorne, 250 F. App’x 316, 318 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (refusing to consider extrinsic evidence in 
light of the “unambiguous” meaning of “as is”).
In the final paragraph of the legal standard to be applied, the court deals with the parol 
evidence rule. Parol evidence may not “add or otherwise modify the terms” of an integrated 
agreement, except where the evidence of other agreements is “incorporated into the 
contract.”80  The panel finishes by stating that the parol evidence rule does not bar extrinsic 
evidence “when the plain and ordinary meaning is not clear,” citing the Restatement, Corbin 
on Contracts, and, strangely, a law review article.81 “Armed with these rules, we turn to the 
issues TEG raises on appeal.”82
Turning to the facts, the court was faced with a contract for asbestos removal that required 
various building materials to “be cleaned to a degree that no traces of debris or residue are 
visible by the Observation Services Contractor.”83 The issues were whether this provision 
required the contractor to remove asbestos from pores and cracks, and what constituted 
“debris or residue.”84 The court held that the plain language covered debris or residue 
contained within pores and cracks, as long as the asbestos was visible.85 The panel looked 
to extrinsic evidence to confirm its interpretation of the plain meaning and found that the 
negotiation history supported its interpretation. Because the provision had been discussed 
by the parties in a conference call, the panel held that it was clear the contractor had 
understood it.86 The court found evidence of trade usage inadmissible on this point because 
no particular term of art was at issue.87 However, with respect to the meaning of “debris or 
residue,” which was not defined by the document, the court affirmed the lower court’s use 
of an industry standard to define the meaning of “debris or residue” in the asbestos removal 
industry.88
The case law discussed above illustrates doctrinal confusion spawned out of disagreement 
over methodology, and later cases continue to display disagreement.89 Some opinions rely on 
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90.  See supra note 13.
91.  11 LoRd, supra note 8, § 32:7 (“[P]ronouncements can be found in numerous cases to the effect that 
evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of a contract may be admitted, like any other parol 
evidence, only where the contract›s meaning is ambiguous. These decisions in truth, reflect a misunderstanding 
both of the scope and purpose of the parol evidence rule.”).
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93.  90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
94.  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 
(1996).
95.  Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.
96.  Id.
97.  Id. at 1582–83.
98.  Id. at 1583.
plain meaning almost exclusively, while others place consideration of certain extrinsic evidence 
on roughly equal footing with plain meaning. The result is a collection of panel opinions that 
appear to set out a Phillips v. AWH Corp.-style list of rules, some of which de facto overrule 
others, without an en banc resolution. The Federal Circuit’s current contract interpretation 
doctrine is also inconsistent with several authoritative secondary sources that permit evidence 
of trade practice and usage to be introduced under all circumstances.90 Williston on Contracts 
even cites McAbee as an example of an improper approach to extrinsic evidence.91
IV. ClAiM ConsTruCTion And The MeThodologiCAl Tug of wAr
Conflicts between the holistic and procedural methodologies are, perhaps, even more 
apparent in claim construction law than they are in contract law. Two particular divisions on 
the court have close analogs in the court’s contract law jurisprudence. The first is whether 
extrinsic evidence can create a question of fact in claim construction. The second is whether 
dictionary definitions are entitled to greater weight than the specification. As with contract 
interpretation, some discussion on the development of claim construction law is necessary. 
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (“Markman II”), the Supreme Court 
concluded that claim construction is a matter of law to be decided by the presiding judge.92 
Shortly after the Markman decision, the Federal Circuit issued the 1996 Vitronics Corp. 
v. Conceptronic, Inc. decision.93 The opinion, written by future Chief Judge Michel, was 
essentially a handbook for claim construction, and the panel’s approach largely parallels the 
guidance provided by the Federal Circuit’s own en banc resolution of the Markman case 
(“Markman I”).94
Under Vitronics, the claim construction analysis proceeds in four steps. First, the 
“ordinary and customary meaning” of the claim language must be ascertained.95 Second, the 
specification must be reviewed to determine if the patentee has “used any terms in a manner 
inconsistent with their ordinary meaning.”96 Third, courts may consider the prosecution 
history.97 Fourth, if any ambiguity remains, courts can consider extrinsic evidence.98 On 
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will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term. In such circumstances, it is improper to rely on extrinsic 
evidence.” Id. The opinion’s tone indicates that reliance on extrinsic evidence is almost always illegitimate.
100.  Id. at 1584.
101.  Id. at 1585.
102.  See supra note 89.
103.  132 F.3d 1437, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
104.  Id. at 1442–43.
105.  Id. at 1447–48 (Mayer, C.J., concurring).
106.  Id. at 1442–43.
107.  Id.
108.  Id. at 1442.
this point the opinion is clear that extrinsic evidence is not to be relied on where possible.99 
Similar to the court’s contract decisions, the panel states that extrinsic evidence “may not 
be used to vary or contradict the claim language.”100 As to the outcome of the case itself, 
the panel held that the district court had erred in its claim construction by relying on expert 
testimony where the claims were unambiguous and the trial court’s claim construction 
excluded the only disclosed embodiment.101
In the years following Markman and Vitronics, the court fractured in various ways. One 
split occurred over whether conflicting extrinsic evidence could create questions of fact in 
claim construction. This question has obvious parallels in contract law, where the prevailing 
view is that an ambiguity creates a question of fact. The Federal Circuit also applies the rule 
that ambiguities create questions of fact, though few of the court’s decisions seem to find a 
contract ambiguous.102
In Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc., a panel was tasked with determining the 
meaning of “anodized” in a method claim directed to anodizing aluminum.103 The dispute 
was over whether the term “anodized oxide coating” encompassed both porous and non-
porous oxides.104 The plain and ordinary meaning of anodized includes both types of oxides, 
but the specification disclosed only porous oxides.105 The district court resolved the issue by 
crediting disputed expert testimony showing that key benefits of the claimed invention could 
only be realized with a porous oxide.106 As a result, the district court excluded non-porous 
oxides from the claim scope, even though doing so was inconsistent with both the plain 
meaning and Vitronics.107
Notably, Fromson does not cite Vitronics and does not recite the plain language standard. 
Instead, the panel begins by stating that “the first resource [for interpreting claims] is the 
patent specification of which they are a part.”108 Fromson did advance a plain language 
argument because the dictionary definition encompassed both porous and non-porous 
oxides. But the panel dismissed the plain language by stating that while “Markman presents 
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116.  See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“The 
patent is a fully integrated written instrument.”) aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
a useful general rule, it is adaptable to the needs of a particular case.”109 This allusion 
to pragmatic flexibility is very indicative of a holistic approach. The structure of the 
panel’s analysis is even more telling of the methodology being employed. The headings 
in the section of the opinion analyzing claim construction appear in the following order: 
“The Specification,” “The Prosecution History and Prior Art,” “Extrinsic Evidence,” 
and “Claim Differentiation.”110 No heading exists for plain language, and the doctrine of 
claim differentiation is analyzed dead last. The panel went on to affirm the district court’s 
claim construction, based primarily on the district court’s resolution of conflicting expert 
testimony.111
Chief Judge Mayer concurred and related that, based on his own personal knowledge, 
Fromson’s explanation of the plain meaning of “anodized” was correct.112 But, in a bold 
move, Chief Judge Mayer stated that the affirmance was based on facts “found from 
conflicting evidence [e.g., expert testimony], which [were] not clearly erroneous.”113
The statements regarding factfinding deference in Fromson were a catalyst for the well-
known and much-discussed en banc decision in Cybor v. FAS Technologies, Inc., which 
overruled Fromson and decided that claim construction has no factual component.114 
Cybor represents a significant victory for the procedural methodology. Precluding extrinsic 
evidence from creating a question of fact implicitly assumes that claim construction issues 
can always be resolved by looking to the four corners of the intrinsic record.115
The court also split over whether dictionaries trump the specification as an interpretive 
tool. Again, this split has an analog in contract law. In contract law, the four corners of the 
document include incorporated documents; likewise, the file wrapper of the patent itself is 
treated as a fully integrated document.116 Thus, awarding primary significance to dictionary 
definitions, in effect, places the four corners on a lower pedestal than dictionary definitions. 
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124.  415 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
This strict evidentiary hierarchy is indicative of a very strong application of the procedural 
methodology.
Vitronics stated that the specification is “the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed 
term” and that the specification “acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in 
the claims or when it defines terms by implication.”117 By contrast, Texas Digital Systems, 
Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc. is exemplary of a post-Markman line of cases staking out a different 
approach wherein dictionaries would often be dispositive of claim construction issues.118 
Texas Digital established a “presumption in favor of a dictionary definition” for disputed 
claim terms.119 The presumption could be rebutted in two ways. First, a dictionary definition 
could be altered “where the patentee, acting as his or her own lexicographer, has clearly set 
forth an explicit definition of the term different from its ordinary meaning.”120 Second, the 
presumption could be rebutted where “the inventor has disavowed or disclaimed scope of 
coverage, by using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a 
clear disavowal of claim scope.”121
The Texas Digital panel’s rejection of a specification-centric approach to claim 
construction is reminiscent of the Jowett panel’s rejection of the Metric Constructors 
approach to trade usage. The Texas Digital panel felt that “[c]onsulting the written 
description and prosecution history as a threshold step in the claim construction process, 
before any effort is made to discern the ordinary and customary meanings attributed to 
the words themselves, invites a violation of our precedent counseling against importing 
limitations into the claims.”122 Similarly, in Jowett, the panel rejected the proposition that 
trade usage should be considered as a threshold step because it required looking outside the 
“four corners” before plain meaning had been considered.123
Both Cybor and Texas Digital were the subject of a granted petition for rehearing en banc 
in Phillips v. AWH Corp.124 In addition to the questions presented in the petition, Chief Judge 
Rader specially requested the parties to brief whether claim construction is “amenable to 
resolution by resort to strictly algorithmic rules,” or if claim construction is “better achieved 
by using the order or tools relevant in each case . . . thus entrusting trial courts to interpret 
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claims as a contract or statute?”125 Chief Judge Rader’s request was, to a great extent, a request 
for the parties to brief the relative merits of the procedural and holistic methodologies. The 
ultimate opinion of the court, however, addresses only Texas Digital and leaves Cybor intact.126
The case itself turned on the meaning of the term “baffles.”127 Specifically, the dispute 
was over whether, in an invention directed to modular panels for “vandalism-resistant 
walls,” the term “baffles” included a structure that is disposed at a right angle.128 A structure 
disposed at a right angle would not have achieved one of the invention’s benefits, the 
deflection of projectiles.129 
The court’s analysis began with a dictionary definition, which encompassed structures at 
right angles, and moved on to note that only the dependent claims specifically recited the 
projectile deflection function.130 Based on those two facts, and because the specification 
did not indicate that all embodiments were required to perform the projectile deflection 
function, the court concluded that “baffles” should be interpreted by its plain and ordinary 
meaning.131 This analysis mirrors the approach set out in Vitronics.132
The Phillips opinion, not unlike Teg-Paradigm,133 contains a comprehensive recitation 
of virtually every canon of claim construction, with leanings toward the Vitronics and 
Markman I “guidelines,” and, of these varied approaches to claim construction, the opinion 
only explicitly criticizes the Texas Digital line of cases. From the perspective of patent law, 
the language Phillips uses to reject Texas Digital seems like a major victory for the holistic 
methodology. Phillips states that evidence need not be analyzed in a particular order.134 
The opinion also states that “there is no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim 
construction.”135 These views are consistent with the holistic methodology’s rejection of an 
inflexible evidentiary hierarchy. The opinion also echoes Corbin when it states that reliance 
on dictionaries “focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning of words rather than on the 
meaning of claim terms within the context of the patent.”136 But, from the perspective of 
contract law, Phillips is not really a holistic decision at all because intrinsic evidence (i.e., 
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the four corners) still governs under virtually all circumstances.137 Indeed, Phillips itself 
used a stipulated dictionary definition as the starting point for the analysis. When viewed 
in that light, Phillips is really just a rejection of the most extreme form of dictionary-based 
hypertextualism embodied by Texas Digital. Under Phillips, extrinsic evidence is still 
disfavored and cannot be introduced to modify seemingly unambiguous intrinsic evidence.138 
Moreover, perhaps in an attempt to attract more judges to the majority opinion, Phillips does 
not explicitly overrule any cases. This means that, as with contract law, the contradictory 
precedents technically remained on the books after Phillips.139
Wagner and Petherbridge found that, on average, the number of holistic opinions did not 
increase immediately after Phillips.140 They suggest six possibilities, and this Article will 
relate three.141 First, Phillips changed nothing because it did not expressly overrule prior 
cases.142 Second, Phillips created a black box that allows judges to do whatever they want.143 
Third, litigants had not yet had time to begin advocating based on Phillips.144 Regrettably, 
no empirical study has analyzed methodology in the post-Phillips era beyond Wagner and 
Petherbridge’s April 15, 2007 cutoff date.
In this author’s view, the key import of Phillips was to ensure that every panel would 
be required to consider the patent’s specification. Unfortunately, that leads to the logical 
contradiction of interpreting claims via the specification without importing limitations 
from it.145 In fact, as Retractable Technologies shows, the legacy of Phillips appears to be a 
continued divide on the court over the issues Cybor and Phillips were meant to resolve.
Judge Moore and Chief Judge Rader read Phillips as authorizing deviation from plain meaning 
only when the patentee clearly disavows claim scope or acts as his own lexicographer.146 By 
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contrast, Judge Lourie, who dissented from the Phillips majority’s claim construction,147 
seems to have concluded that claims ought to be limited by the disclosure in a manner 
slightly reminiscent of the pre-1836 central claiming regime.148 Judge Plager concurs.149 
As a practical matter, this division on the court is very significant—just ask Retractable 
Technologies. But from the perspective of this Article, this dispute is much ado about 
nothing. The judges are arguing for competing evidentiary hierarchies. In other words, 
this is a judicial brouhaha over whether “you get what you disclose” is a more accurate 
statement than “the name of the game is the claim.”150 Regardless of the outcome, a 
relatively strict, hierarchical approach that relies on the four corners will prevail. 
The dispute over Cybor and deference in claim construction is far more significant. 
Three of the judges dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc in Retractable 
Technologies expressed a desire to explore a regime where some manner of factfinding 
deference is shown to district court claim constructions. And in a 2006 denial of rehearing 
en banc in the Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. case, six judges expressed 
similar desires.151 Because showing factfinding deference in claim construction requires 
an admission that the four corners are often inadequate to resolve issues of document 
interpretation, one can expect entrenched disagreement in this area. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that the court’s division over deference in claim construction has persisted for 
well over a decade.
ConClusion
The objective of this Article has not been to argue that the holistic methodology is superior 
to the procedural methodology, or vice versa. Rather, the goal has been to demonstrate 
that divisions on the Federal Circuit may grow out of fundamentally different approaches 
to interpreting legal documents and not out of disagreement over the proper construction 
of the patent statutes or reasonable disagreement over how to resolve close cases. If this 
proposition is true, then it demonstrates that some splits on the Federal Circuit may run so 
deeply that they will only be fully and finally resolved by changing the composition of the 
court.152 From the discussion above, several general conclusions can be drawn.
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The Federal Circuit’s contract interpretation jurisprudence substantially parallels its claim 
construction law. In both situations, the documents are interpreted from the perspective of 
an objective third party. The court begins by looking to the plain language of the document, 
which includes the specification and the prosecution history in the case of a patent. If 
the plain language is unambiguous, the inquiry is usually over. If the plain language is 
ambiguous, then the court may consider extrinsic evidence in an attempt to resolve the 
ambiguity. In both contract interpretation and claim construction, courts may use extrinsic 
evidence to confirm their understanding of unambiguous language. However, one key 
difference between the two doctrines is the treatment of trade usage and practice. In contract 
law, extrinsic evidence regarding specific terms of art may be considered. By contrast, in 
claim construction, resort to any extrinsic evidence is generally disfavored. In contract 
interpretation, the court rarely finds any issue of underlying fact that need be resolved, and, 
under Cybor, claim construction can never involve a question of fact as a matter of law.153
The court does not cite patent cases in contract cases, or vice versa,154 but the parallels in 
the doctrines are difficult to explain without acknowledging that the court’s overall judicial 
philosophy influences how it interprets written documents. Indeed, the court’s refusal to 
follow contract doctrine that became commonly accepted as early as the 1960s is indicative 
of the judges’ underlying philosophies. This suggests that patent advocates and scholars 
should remain abreast of the court’s contract interpretation cases, or at least the en banc 
opinions. In doing so, students of patent law can obtain a better understanding of the court’s 
overall jurisprudence, and also a better understanding of how particular judges may weigh 
certain evidence.155 For example, Metric Constructors was an opinion by Chief Judge Rader, 
while Jowett and Hunt Construction were both opinions written by Judge Dyk. None of the 
Metric Constructors judges sat for Jowett or Hunt Construction. 
Separate opinions chastising a panel for failing to consider extrinsic evidence, 
and vice versa, could be a way to identify holistic judges or to predict divisions on 
the court.156 Having an extra set of cases to draw data from is particularly helpful 
when trying to understand the mindset of newer judges like Judge Reyna and Judge 
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Wallach.157 Extra data sets will become even more important in the near future as several 
Federal Circuit judges are already eligible for senior status.
However, engaging in a stereotype-the-judge analysis is also an invitation to error. 
McAbee was a very formalistic opinion written by Judge Mayer, and joined by Judge 
Newman and Chief Judge Rader. Yet Chief Judge Rader penned the highly holistic opinion 
in Metric Constructors. The McAbee panel also accounted for every Cybor dissenter.158 In 
sum, judges can be difficult to predict, and every case presents its own problems.
Finally, it is worth noting that of all the contract cases discussed in this Article, only one 
case permitted extrinsic evidence to overcome plain language. In Metric Constructors, the 
plain duty to replace all lamps was limited to a duty to replace defective lamps. Most of the 
other cases found extrinsic evidence to be consistent with the plain language, though some 
cases refused to consider extrinsic evidence altogether.159 The Federal Circuit’s contract 
interpretation cases thus indicate that, in a claim construction dispute, the party relying 
on plain language will be significantly more likely to prevail than the party making an 
argument that relies on extrinsic evidence.160 In other words, the old adage still rings true, 
the name of the game is the claim (for now). 
